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Original Acquisition of Property: From Conquest & 
Possession to Democracy & Equal Opportunity† 
JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER∗ 
“I have been thinking,” said Arthur, “about Might and Right. I don’t 
think things ought to be done because you are able to do them. I think 
they should be done because you ought to do them. After all, a penny is 
a penny in any case, however much Might is exerted on either side, to 
prove that it is or is not. Is that plain?” 
~ T.H. White1 
Where do property rights come from? If you believe the property casebooks, we 
acquire original title to property by conquering other nations, hunting animals, 
catching baseballs, encroaching on our neighbors’ lands, drilling for oil, and 
finding lost jewels.2 You’ve heard the expression “possession is nine-tenths of the 
law.” It turns out it’s actually true. If you can take it, you can keep it—not exactly 
the most morally attractive justification for the rights of owners. Imagine teaching 
your children that the way to get things is to grab whatever they can. But maybe 
there is something to the possession theory. What would we have to believe to 
make possession a just original source of title to property? 
Possession is plausible as a source of title only if you are not taking something 
that already belongs to someone else. If you are the first possessor of an unowned 
object, like a wild animal or a deserted island, possession is like magic; it allows 
you to create something out of nothing. Who could reasonably object to your 
claim? No one has been displaced by your act of occupation and everyone else is 
perfectly free to go out and hunt their own foxes and discover their own uncharted 
shores. 
Two problems disturb this rosy scenario. First, the magic disappears if you take 
all the cookies on the plate and leave none for your little sister. As John Locke 
recognized long ago, possession raises no moral issues only as long as it does not 
deprive others of similar paths to ownership. Locke argued that property rights in 
land were justified only if “there is enough, and as good left in common for 
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others.”3 This little caveat is affectionately called the “Lockean proviso.” If I 
occupy land and others do not have equal opportunities to do the same thing, then 
my act of first possession cannot be considered to be what John Stuart Mill called a 
self-regarding act; rather, my actions impose externalities on others.4 And those 
externalities are not minor in nature; because human beings need things to survive, 
monopolizing things needed for human life can only be justified if others have 
equal opportunity to get what they need.5 This makes the relationship between 
possession and equal opportunity a central problem. 
The second wrinkle with the original possession idea is the unfortunate fact that 
most things already do have owners, and if you grab something originally 
possessed by someone else, then you are not a first possessor. When you dispossess 
another possessor, you have done something wrong. We have words for someone 
like you and they are not pretty words; if you take someone else’s car we call you a 
thief and if you take someone else’s country we use words like imperialist and 
conqueror. When you steal a car, your title is no good no matter how long you 
possess it. In U.S. law, thieves do not acquire good title to property, no matter how 
long they keep their booty. But conquest is another matter; here is a case where 
theft does confer legal rights. International law may condemn conquest, but it also 
rewards the conquerors with sovereignty. As Thucydides reports in The 
Peloponnesian War, the Athenians justified their conquest of Melos by arguing 
“you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question 
between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer 
what they must.”6 
For us in the United States, this is not merely a theoretical problem. When 
Europeans first came here, America was not an empty land. The colonial powers 
acquired the land from the native inhabitants by conquest. Sometimes they simply 
occupied native lands; sometimes they entered treaties to force Indian nations to 
sell their land; and sometimes they engaged in conquest by legislation, simply 
passing a statute transferring Indian title to the colonial power. Conquest denies the 
rights of first possessors. If first possession is the legitimate origin of title, then we 
non-Indians cannot trace our titles to a just origin. 
To make clear that these issues are not merely theoretical, consider the case of 
Cobell v. Salazar.7 In 1996, a class action suit was brought against the United 
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States alleging that the Departments of the Interior and the Treasury and the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs mismanaged the property of individual Indians. The U.S. 
government manages many lands owned by individual tribal members and often 
leases those lands to oil and gas interests. The Indian land owners are entitled to 
receive royalties on whatever is found on those lands. Unfortunately, the 
government did a horrendously bad job of managing the accounts, often not making 
the payments to the Indian owners and eventually losing records. The payments 
were either not made to the government at all or they were made and the 
government kept the money and failed to turn it over to the Indian owners. Because 
the records were lost, it is hard to say how much money is owed to the Indian 
owners, but the amount may be as high as fifty billion dollars. After more than 
thirteen years of litigation, the parties reached a settlement of $3.4 billion of which 
$1.4 billion would go to the Indian owners.8 Three and one-half billion dollars is a 
lot of money but everyone agrees it is far less than what is actually owed. Congress 
approved the settlement and President Obama signed the legislation on December 
8, 2010.9 Indians disagree among themselves on whether the settlement is a good or 
a bad thing.10 Some argue that the plaintiffs should not settle for an amount that is 
so far less than what they are probably owed while others argue that this is the best 
they can expect and that proving the amount owed is not possible given the lost 
records. Let’s be clear that these are not welfare payments that are contemplated; 
these Indians are landowners and the government effectively stole their property by 
not paying them these royalties. At the same time, the difficulty and expense of 
figuring out how much each person is owed could take years, and the government 
has failed to do this despite numerous court orders and a federal statute ordering it 
to do so. How Congress responds will tell us whether or not the United States does 
respect the rights of first possessors. 
Land titles in the United States suffer from two, rather fundamental, defects: the 
problem of conquest and the problem of the Lockean proviso. How worried should 
we be about this? How much do these complications undermine our current titles to 
land? And if, as I will argue, they are both serious issues, what are we to do about 
it?  
I. FROM CONQUEST TO DEMOCRACY 
Let’s start with the issue of conquest. Both our philosophical traditions and our 
property law casebooks suggest that first possession is the origin of property. But 
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title to land in the United States rests on the forced taking of land from first 
possessors—the very opposite of respect for first possession. Conquest is a mode of 
original acquisition that we cannot sweep under the rug by pretending that it 
accords with any recognizable principle of justice. And conquest, unfortunately, is 
where American history starts—as does the title to almost every parcel of land in 
the United States. This is a highly inconvenient (not to say stunningly 
demoralizing) fact, not least of all to the Indian nations that continue to inhabit the 
North American continent.  
First possession, it turns out, is only a theory. Our actual property system rests 
on the opposite view. William the Conqueror invaded England in 1066 and started 
the feudal system that was the source of all current titles to land there, as well as 
the estates system that is the centerpiece of traditional American property law. The 
European colonizers invaded America and seized the land of Indian nations. 
Contrary to what the property law casebooks suggest, Great Britain and the United 
States rejected the doctrine of first possession; by adopting the doctrine of 
discovery, they refused to honor the rights of first possessors. Rather, they based 
property titles on their claims of racial superiority, and they backed those claims by 
force.11 They had many arguments to justify conquest as legitimate, just, honorable, 
and compatible with the wishes of God, but those arguments no longer strike us as 
convincing.12  
From a moral point of view, conquest puts all current land titles in doubt.13 
Robert Nozick’s libertarian theory of the minimal state suggests that property rights 
are legitimate if they have their source in a just system of acquisition and then are 
freely transferred.14 If their origin is tainted, the whole system fails.15 How do we, 
as a nation, deal with the issue of conquest? We adopt two competing strategies. 
Half of the time we engage in the time-honored practice of repression; we deny this 
part of our history. We ignore it or we acknowledge it only to marginalize it. The 
other half of the time we face the issue of conquest head on but we try to legitimate 
the events by which we acquired title from Indian nations.  
Let’s start with the strategy of denial. Many of us protect ourselves from having 
to think too deeply about conquest by distancing ourselves from it. Amazingly, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 11. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, 
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some property casebooks fail to mention Indians at all.16 Most property casebooks 
treat conquest as unfortunate but past. The casebooks that deal with conquest 
immediately follow the topic with cases affirming first possession as the root of 
title, as if to show that we have moved beyond barbarism to civilization.17 If we can 
relegate conquest to the distant past, we can concentrate instead on the fact that the 
United States was founded on respect for property rights. We do not acquire 
property by conquest today. 
This comforting story is misleading at best and false at worst. We cannot 
comfort ourselves with the idea that conquest became a thing of the past with the 
American Revolution, independence from Great Britain, and the adoption of the 
U.S. Constitution. Like prior colonial powers, the United States claimed to share 
title to Indian lands with the Indian nations who possessed and ruled those lands. In 
1823, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Johnson v. M’Intosh that Indian lands were 
held under a unique estate in land called “Indian title”—a title split between the 
“ultimate title” held by the United States and a “title of occupancy” held by the 
relevant Indian nation.18 This split title remains to this day; the majority of lands 
owned by Indian nations today is held in what is called “trust status” and is co-
owned by the tribes and the United States. This assertion of co-ownership is an act 
of conquest that continues to this day. 
More devastatingly, the conquest of Indian lands is not something that predates 
the United States. Nor did it happen only in our early history. The United States 
took most of the lands of Indian nations over the course of the nineteenth century, 
often for inadequate compensation and against the will of the Indian nation whose 
lands were greatly diminished. And during the Lochner era from the 1890s to the 
1930s, when the U.S. Supreme Court was at its activist height in striking down 
progressive legislation in the name of protecting freedom of contract and private 
property, the United States forcibly took two-thirds of the remaining lands of the 
Indian nations. The United States took some of those lands from the tribes by 
eminent domain and resold them to non-Indians, but most of those seizures were 
taken from the tribes without any compensation at all; they were transferred in 
“allotments” to individual tribal members. The Supreme Court ruled that this tribal 
property could be taken without compensation because changing from communal 
to individual ownership constituted a “mere change in the form of investment”19—a 
conclusion that would never be accepted in the non-Indian context.20 
                                                                                                                 
 
 16. One book that gives little attention to the Indian origins of property rights in the 
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Nor did these deprivations of property rights cease as the twentieth century 
continued. In the 1950s, for example, the United States took timber from a band of 
the Tlingits who occupied southeastern Alaska. The Supreme Court held in 1955 
that the Tee-Hit-Ton Band possessed merely a license to live on the land—
revocable permission by the whites to occupy Alaskan territory. The consequence 
of this was that Alaska Natives had the right to live on the land and to exclude 
others, but they possessed no “property” rights protected by the Fifth 
Amendment.21 Thus their land could be taken without compensation. This decision 
came one year after Brown v. Board of Education, and the Tee-Hit-Ton decision 
proclaimed that the Constitution protects the property rights of all Americans 
except the natives who originally possessed the land—in other words, the first 
possessors. This is not ancient history; I was born the year before this decision was 
rendered. This case has never been overruled, and the Supreme Court continues to 
cite it as good law.22  
To be clear that these acts of injustice are not necessarily past, consider the case 
of United States v. Navajo Nation, decided April 6, 2009—just one year ago.23 That 
case involved Navajo coal resources held under that peculiar joint title with the 
United States—a joint title that the United States exercises to oversee tribal leases 
of land to private corporations. The Navajo Nation argued that the United States 
mismanaged Navajo property, knowingly approving a lease for less than fair 
market value based on information the corporation had provided the United States 
that it failed to share with the tribe. The Supreme Court held that the tribe has no 
claim against the United States for mismanagement of tribal lands, even if the 
United States has exerted complete control over the property, unless Congress has 
passed a statute implicitly granting the tribe a right of action to sue for damages for 
mismanagement. If the United States shares management with the tribe and 
engages in acts that harm tribal property rights, the tribe has no remedy unless 
Congress affirmatively chooses to provide one.24 So much for protection of tribal 
property.25 
Repression is a time-honored method for dealing with painful events. But if we 
face facts, we cannot be comforted with the idea that conquest is something that 
predates the United States. Nor is it a thing of the past to grant Indian nations less 
protection for their property rights than is granted to non-Indians. Conquest is part 
and parcel of the American story and it is not something we can treat as finished or 
completely repudiated. 
If the denial strategy cannot work to give us moral comfort, perhaps conquest 
can be justified in some other way. What legitimating strategies are open to us? 
First, perhaps our titles are legitimate simply because the law declared them to be 
                                                                                                                 
 
 21. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 284–85 (1955). 
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 23. 129 S. Ct. 1547 (2009). 
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legitimate. Theorists have long debated whether property comes from natural rights 
or government fiat. Conquest is an act of state power—usually by someone 
purporting to exercise that power for legitimate reasons and in justifiable ways. 
Positivists identify laws as coming from commands of the sovereign or rules 
created by government officials empowered to make them. If property originates in 
an exercise of power by a recognized sovereign, then property comes from positive 
law. This is the position taken by Thomas Hobbes and Jeremy Bentham.26 They 
argued that property rights are created by law to achieve various social purposes, 
especially promoting investment and attaining a secure life.   
The positivist tradition might solve our problem. That theory says that property 
rights come from the state; they neither preexist the state in a temporal sense nor 
have any moral validity independent of positive law. If we take this view, perhaps 
we can set aside those little moral questions of conquest and dispossession. 
Conquest was bad, yes, but it happened and we cannot undo it. Property must begin 
somewhere and in our system it begins with the seizure of Indian lands. Since we 
cannot rectify this in anything more than an imperfect way, we have no choice but 
to trace original title to property back to the governmental act of seizing Indian 
territory and transferring it to the first non-Indian owners. As Chief Justice John 
Marshall wrote in confronting this painful history, “Conquest gives a title which the 
Courts of the conqueror cannot deny, whatever the private and speculative opinions 
of individuals may be, respecting the original justice of the claim which has been 
successfully asserted.”27  
There is something to this. We live, after all, in the real world. But moral claims 
are based, not on what is, but what should be. The law may declare me to be the 
owner of my house but that does not give us a reason to think the law is just. 
A second legitimating strategy is utilitarianism. Perhaps we can get beyond all 
this by remembering that positivists like Jeremy Bentham generally seek support in 
the moral theory of cost-benefit analysis.28 Let’s be pragmatic about all this. We are 
where we are because we got here the way we got here. In science fiction, you can 
redo things, but in the real world, the past is past. The only rational thing to do is to 
start with the status quo—now, where we are—and see if any proposed changes in 
law or policy would make us collectively better off. Thus, both Hobbes and 
Bentham suggested a utilitarian calculus—Hobbes, by suggesting that we are all 
better off vesting full authority in the state to allocate and define property rights, 
and Bentham, by suggesting a more modern conception of cost-benefit analysis 
designed to test current laws by their contribution to the general welfare.29 This line 
of thought suggests not inquiring too deeply into the origins of property rights. The 
costs of rectifying those unjust origins surely outweigh the benefits; after all, are all 
the inhabitants of the American continent other than Native Americans supposed to 
return to Europe or Africa or Asia? Who would they displace if they went back to 
the land of their ancestors? No: on this view, the injustice of origins is something 
                                                                                                                 
 
 26. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION (Dover Publ’ns 2007) (1780); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Richard Tuck ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press rev. student ed. 2008) (1651).  
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 29. See id.; HOBBES, supra note 26, at 121–29. 
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we best relegate to history courses; it may be important to tell the story, but it 
should not impact current law or policy regarding ownership of land. The utilitarian 
solution suggests that we start from current distributions of land, whatever their 
origins, and ask whether a redistribution of title creates benefits that outweigh the 
costs. 
This solution may be attractive but its attractions are illusory. For one thing, it is 
not clear why we should view the status quo as a neutral and morally defensible 
starting place. If a thief has possession of a car, we do not presume the thief has the 
right to keep the car; we do not compare the costs to the thief of returning the car to 
the benefits to the owner in retrieving her car. The status quo baseline presumes 
that Indian nations should be content with what they have, but if we stole their land 
from them, it is not clear why this should be the case.  
Even if we could view the status quo distribution of land between Indian nations 
and the United States as a neutral starting place, it is not clear how we should value 
the costs and benefits of changing from one property distribution to another. 
Perhaps we should simply recognize that Indians are a small percentage of the U.S. 
population and that granting such a small group title to all the land in the United 
States cannot possibly increase social welfare. The needs of the many outweigh the 
needs of the few. But if we think about social utility in this way, we then can justify 
doing anything to a minority group as long as the majority group wins. Modern 
utilitarian theory refuses to accept the idea that costs and benefits should be 
measured in that way. The moral impulse behind utilitarian theory is to count each 
person as one and no more than one. It is premised, in other words, on the sanctity 
and equality of all individuals. To sacrifice one for the benefit of others is to violate 
the principle of equal concern and respect for each individual that is the underlying 
normative premise on which utilitarianism is based. For this reason, sophisticated 
moral theorists who adopt utilitarianism as an approach argue for a morally-
constrained version of the theory.30 Those moral constraints ensure that costs and 
benefits are not valued and compared in a manner that allows the many to ignore 
completely the interests of the few. 
Government fiat, without more, is unacceptable as a just source of original title 
to property, but a utilitarian cost-benefit calculus cannot help us unless we figure 
out what moral constraints to use in valuing costs and benefits. How do we define 
those moral constraints? Perhaps the natural rights tradition stands us on firmer 
ground.  
A third legitimating strategy justifies current land titles by the idea that we can 
trace our titles to the first possessors of the land. We actually acquired most of the 
land in the United States by transactions with Indian nations. Most treaties with 
Indian Nations involved transfers of land from those nations to the United States 
for substantial amounts of money. In short, we bought America from the Indians.31 
Some property law casebooks adopt this strategy, acknowledging that federal law 
                                                                                                                 
 
 30. WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 26–
32, 37–45 (2d ed. 2002); MARK TIMMONS, MORAL THEORY 144–47 (2002). 
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prevented the tribes from selling to anyone but the United States.32 If first 
possession is the origin of title, then we can rest easy that we have good property 
rights because we acquired our title by buying the land from the first possessors. 
We actually do have a legitimate chain of title and a legitimate origin after all. 
There is one major problem with this legitimating story. Those transfers were 
less than voluntary.33 Consider a story I recall being told by my college economics 
professor, Randall Bartlett. You are in a deep pit filled with poisonous snakes, and I 
come along and offer to sell you the use of a ladder. In exchange I ask only that you 
give me half your future earnings and custody of your firstborn child. You agree to 
buy and I agree to sell. The deal is Pareto efficient; we are both better off 
afterwards than we were beforehand. Why not enforce the contract? I had no legal 
duty to help you and I did not hold a gun to your head; I simply offered you a 
pleasant alternative to an impending painful death and you eagerly accepted. 
Pleasant as the alternative may be, it is still a coerced deal. We did not have 
equal bargaining power; indeed, you had no bargaining power at all. I could have 
gotten you to agree to be my slave and you might well have accepted. What I 
offered was only a little better than that. Besides, there are some demands we are 
not allowed to make in a free and democratic society that treats each person with 
equal concern and respect. T.H. White wrote in The Once and Future King that 
King Arthur explained: “What I meant by civilization when I invented it, was 
simply that people ought not to take advantage of weakness . . . .”34 The treaties 
entered into with Indian nations did commendably reflect the United States’s view 
that Indian nations did have some property rights in their lands, but those treaties 
cannot be defended on the ground that they constituted voluntary transactions. Nor 
can we comfort ourselves with the observation that the Indians were compensated 
for their land. Such compensation is not adequate to rectify the injustices of 
conquest. 
Recall that this was the argument made by advocates for Suzette Kelo, who 
sought an injunction stopping the city of New London, Connecticut, from taking 
her house.35 She asked, not for heightened compensation, but for the power to 
refuse to allow the transfer of title to happen at all; she wanted a right to keep her 
home and argued that compensation of any amount was not a fair substitute for her 
power to decide when, if ever, to sell her home. If she was right, then compensation 
is not an adequate remedy for an unjust seizure of land. 
The Supreme Court in Kelo v. City of New London allowed the city to take her 
house so the property could be redeveloped along with other property in the 
neighborhood to revitalize the local economy.36 That Supreme Court opinion 
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unleashed a storm of criticism. Some critics suggested that never before in U.S. 
history did the government take property from some to transfer it to others simply 
because the government thought those others could use the property better than the 
original owners.37 It would be good to remember that this is exactly what happened 
when tribal lands were taken for transfer to non-Indians. And those lands taken 
from Indian nations amount to ninety-eight percent of the land in the United States. 
Americans may be outraged by the Kelo decision but almost all of them are living 
on land taken from one owner and given to their predecessors in interest. The 
uncomfortable truth is that the history of the entire country is founded on this 
precise injustice. 
A fourth legitimating strategy—and perhaps the most important—is time. Too 
much time has passed to rectify the wrongs of conquest. This recognition of 
political reality is one we cannot ignore. It may be the best argument to affirm 
current non-Indian titles to land.38 Yet, it does not give us a just source of title. 
Again to quote T.H. White: “Unfortunately we have tried to establish Right by 
Might, and you can’t do that.”39  
Where does that leave us? The answer is that it leaves us in an uncomfortable 
place. Both the great philosophers and our property law casebooks argue that the 
origins of property rights are crucial to determining their legitimacy, but if our land 
titles have no legitimate root of title, then the whole system is placed in doubt. 
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What is the answer to our dilemma? To begin with, we must reject the path of 
denial and repression. We must tell our history and tell it accurately—the good and 
the bad. As someone once said, the truth will set us free, but first it will make us 
miserable. There is bad news here, but there is good news as well.  
First the bad news. We cannot trace our land titles to a just origin, and we 
should stop pretending we can. Our titles come from a combination of military 
conquest of sovereign nations and forced relocations of free peoples. Not a pretty 
picture and we should stop denying it. 
Now the good news. The United States is a democracy. It is not perfect, but it 
tries to live by the principle that governments derive their power from the consent 
of the governed while limiting the power of elected representatives through legal 
protection of fundamental constitutional rights. We did not simply kill all the native 
inhabitants, as happened in some countries, and, for the most part, we did not 
declare the land to be vacant terra nullius open for occupation. Rather, from the 
time of the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, the United States partially recognized 
the preexisting property rights of Indian nations, and it arranged for transfers of 
title from those nations to the United States.  
In three crucial opinions decided by the Supreme Court in the 1820s and 1830s, 
Chief Justice John Marshall sought to slow down the march of conquest by 
announcing that Indian lands could not be taken without the full and voluntary 
consent of the Indian owners.40 Those opinions were not completely admirable; 
they contained offensive racist language and justified the discovery doctrine by 
claiming that Indians were savage and uncivilized. But they also tried to enact U.S. 
ideals. They did so by admitting the injustice of conquest and adopting legal rules 
designed to limit its injustices in the future. 
The United States ignored the rule that tribal property could not be taken 
forcibly and against the will of the Indian tribes. Again and again the United States 
took tribal property involuntarily. But the transfers did affirm that the tribes had 
legitimate initial partial title to their lands, and much of the time those transfers 
were accompanied by substantial compensation. In addition, Congress passed a 
statute in 1946 called the Indian Claims Commission Act that allowed Indian 
nations to bring lawsuits against the United States for compensation if they could 
show that they had not been fairly compensated for their lands to begin with.41 That 
law was far from perfect but it reflected American values and attempted to extend 
them to the first possessors of our lands. 
We need to rewrite our history books so that our children understand the actual 
process by which we acquired title to lands in the United States. Most of our 
children learn that our lands were acquired from other colonial powers but they do 
not learn as much about the history of Indian land cessions. And most of our 
children are not taught that Indian nations still own two percent of the land in the 
United States or that the federal government recognizes more than 565 Indian 
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nations that enjoy government-to-government relations with the United States. And 
our law students are taught the relations between the federal and state governments, 
but many are not taught about the hundreds of other sovereigns that continue, 
against all odds, to live among us non-Indians.  
The answer to our problem of origins of property rights is the practice of 
democracy. Democracy entails the idea of collective governance over the 
conditions of our lives while also recognizing respect for human rights. Laws 
adopted by elected representatives have some claim to legitimacy even if they 
concern property rights, and constitutions have some claim to legitimacy if they are 
adopted by the people themselves. As has been pointed out by Milner Ball and 
Philip Frickey, the Indian nations did not sign the Constitution.42 How then did they 
become incorporated legally into the United States? The answer is that, if they did 
become incorporated legitimately and legally, it happened through the treaty 
process. Treaties with Indian nations, Frickey argues, are quasi-constitutional 
documents.43 And Robert Williams explains that most Indian nations regard treaties 
as relationships of mutual respect and ongoing engagement.44 The treaties with 
Indian nations were not one-time contracts that involved transfers of title but 
entailed mutual recognition of continuing government-to-government relationships 
between Indian nations and the United States—a policy that has been formally 
expressed by every President, Republican and Democrat, since Richard Nixon.45 
If conquest is not a legitimate source of title, then land in the United States was 
not obtained legitimately from Indian nations. That means that we non-Indians are 
living on Indian land. We have no choice but to live with the burdens of history. 
The democratic way to deal with this is to reduce the injustices associated with 
conquest. The absolute minimum that we could do today to accomplish this is to 
stop engaging in acts of conquest now. That means respecting retained tribal 
property rights and respecting the existing sovereignty of Indian nations. I am 
sometimes asked why we should recognize tribal sovereignty. This question betrays 
ignorance both about American history and current U.S. law. Tribal sovereignty 
exists now. It has always existed, and it is recognized by U.S. law. It preexisted the 
United States and represents sovereignty that the United States never extinguished. 
To limit the sovereign powers of Indian nations over their reserved lands without 
their consent is to engage in an act of conquest. That should stop. 
Our land titles do not have a just origin, but we have attempted to rectify this by 
providing partial compensation to Indian nations for their lost lands and by 
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adopting a policy of self-determination, recognizing tribal sovereignty and reserved 
property rights. This means respecting tribal off-reservation hunting and fishing 
and water rights, and on-reservation powers to govern tribal territories free of state 
law. Tribes who seek such protections are not asking for special rights denied to 
others. They are asking that we not continue the practice of conquest.  
II. FROM POSSESSION TO EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 
Now we must turn our attention to the Lockean proviso. Locke argued that first 
possession is a legitimate source of title only if “there is enough, and as good left in 
common for others.”46 Locke went on to argue that private property was justified 
even though all the land is taken because the adoption of a money economy left 
everyone better off than before we adopted the social institution of private 
property.47 On that theory, we have nothing to worry about from the Lockean 
proviso. Surely a system of private property and market relations is better than not 
having such a system at all. Homeless families may suffer from the lack of a place 
to sleep at night, but we would all be worse off if we did not recognize the right of 
owners to exclude nonowners from their homes. 
Given the current recession and the harsh struggles of many Americans to find 
work, we should not dismiss the Lockean proviso so easily. Nor should we ignore 
the fact that family background is the best predictor of future economic status. 
According to Locke, private property is justified only if each person has an equal 
chance to become an owner. It is a question of debate what that principle requires, 
but it is a major error for property law casebooks to justify original acquisition of 
property by reference to the principle of first possession without acknowledging the 
Lockean proviso or in some way addressing the distributive issues involved in a 
private property system. We would be untrue to the normative reasons that make 
first possession legitimate if we did not teach that first possession is legitimate only 
if others have equal opportunities to acquire property themselves. What are the 
consequences of this principle? 
The conservative view is that existing distributions of property must be 
respected. Both redistribution and taxation of property designed to take the 
property of some to be transferred to others are per se illegitimate. Property rights 
are either respected or they are not respected; to take someone’s property to give it 
to someone else is never justified.48 And limitations on the rights of owners are 
simply another means of taking some sticks in the bundle of rights that goes along 
with ownership and transferring them to others. The natural rights tradition 
suggests that property rights have a strong normative basis that justifies legal 
protection regardless of the consequences of protecting those rights; on this view, 
one cannot be both for property and for redistributive efforts that transfer property 
from the rich to the poor. 
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Progressives, on the other hand, advocate redistribution of property to promote 
equality. Doesn’t this represent an attack on property rights? The answer is no.49 
Recall why the first possession story is so prevalent both in our property casebooks 
and in our national myths. People need homes where they can rest, play, and enjoy 
human relationships. Property is necessary for liberty. That is why we should allow 
people to possess land. Because we live in a democracy that seeks to treat each 
person with equal concern and respect, the right to acquire property cannot be 
limited to those lucky few who came first. If property is necessary for liberty, and if 
each person has an equal right to be free, then it follows that property rights are not 
justified unless each person has an equal opportunity to acquire the property 
necessary for a full human life. When Texas economist Robert Montgomery was 
questioned about whether he favored private property, he replied, “I do—so 
strongly that I want everyone in Texas to have some.”50 
If this is so, we must reject the idea that property rights are absolute and that 
taxation and regulation designed to promote equal opportunity violate property 
rights. Libertarians like Robert Nozick have it exactly backwards. Nozick argued 
that if thousands of people pay money to see a great basketball player like Wilt 
Chamberlin, why doesn’t he have a right to keep the money?51 The answer is that 
property rights, if they become very unequally distributed over time, give the 
wealthy more and more power over economic and social life. Equal opportunity is 
not something that happens once and then we are indifferent to the distribution of 
abilities to acquire property in the future. If one is born to a poor family and attends 
a poor public school and has less access to the social and economic means to get 
ahead, the resulting distribution of property cannot be characterized as just even if 
our goal is maximizing liberty. As Jeremy Waldron and Frank Michelman have 
argued, if property is needed for liberty, then each person must have a realistic 
opportunity to acquire the material bases for exercising those liberties.52  
Nozick argued that we should adopt a historical approach to property.53 He 
meant that we establish just means of original acquisition, allow free transfers, and 
then respect the property rights that emerge regardless of their distribution. But this 
is an odd approach to history. A true historical approach would start with what 
really happened rather than a fictitious state of nature. As I have noted, our property 
history begins in 1066 when William conquered England and began the feudal 
system. He gave the whole country to dozens of his family and friends and 
established a hierarchical society. Over time, both Great Britain and the United 
States moved from feudalism to democracy. Eventually we abolished slavery; we 
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have abolished racial segregation; we have abolished the rights of husbands to 
control their wives’ property. Our democratic system of property starts, not with 
the state of nature, but with the constitutional prohibition on titles of nobility and 
with laws that prohibit social relationships that give some people unwarranted 
power over others. Democracies do not allow people to create any and all forms of 
ownership; many types of property relationships are banned. They are off the 
menu. Laws and policies designed to promote equal opportunities for all are not 
infringements on property rights. They are the only thing that justifies property 
rights in a democracy.54 
We do not acquire property today by staking claims in the wilderness. Original 
acquisition of property today comes, not from conquest or first possession, but 
from family, work, and investment. Most people acquire property initially from 
their parents who care for them, provide them a home, and help them find their way 
in the world. If family is a major source of original acquisition of property today, 
then children whose parents are poor, and cannot provide for them, are at a severe 
disadvantage.55 Equal opportunity will exist only if both law and government 
policy actively seek to create it. 
Outside the family, most property is acquired through work, investment, and 
exchange. These methods of acquisition involve collaborative ventures with others. 
These social and economic relationships are mediated and regulated by law. 
Americans often say they distrust government, but they demand laws that impose 
minimum standards for contractual relationships. Our most libertarian states 
regulate the workplace to ensure that we have safe places to work and that we do 
not face unjust discrimination on the job. They regulate insurance companies and 
banks so that our money is there when we need it. They regulate consumer products 
like cars to ensure that they are safe and perform as advertised. They regulate land 
use so that our homes and businesses can expect a secure, unpolluted, and pleasant 
environment. They regulate professions like building contractors, lawyers, and 
doctors to ensure that we do not entrust our money and our lives to quacks. These 
regulations are not designed to take away our liberty; these laws are what makes us 
free.56 
The estates system may be arcane and confusing but the principle behind it is 
crucial: some packages of property rights are unlawful in a free and democratic 
society. We outlaw particular packages of rights because they are incompatible 
with our way of life; democracies do not countenance titles of nobility, feudal 
relations of unequal status, apartheid, or plantation slavery. Sometimes we outlaw 
particular packages because they interfere with the welfare-promoting functions of 
a free market; they inhibit alienability or they impede competition or they cause 
other harmful externalities. The current recession, caused by the subprime 
mortgage foreclosure crisis, means that never again will it be difficult for property 
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law professors to explain that it should be illegal to create certain packages of 
property rights. Securitized subprime mortgages granted without adequate record 
keeping or safeguards have resulted in toxic assets that have wrecked the world 
economy. There are reasons not to allow such packages to be created in the first 
place.  
Libertarians argue that property rights cannot be limited or redistributed to 
promote equality because this violates the rights of owners. But property rights are 
not, and cannot be, absolute. The only way to have absolute property rights is to 
follow Thomas Hobbes and give all the property to a king or queen and let them 
have full power over it. But that kind of society is a monarchy or a tyranny. If you 
want to live in a democracy, then property rights must be limited by law. If you 
want every person to have the chance to become an owner and if you want their 
property rights to enjoy basic protections, then you must regulate the packages of 
rights that can be created. Property exists only if we have property law, and law 
exists only if we have government to issue regulations. One cannot be for property 
and against government. 
This means that the rights of current owners must be limited to ensure that 
everyone can become an owner. Nor does this violate the normative basis of our 
story of origins—quite the contrary. Property rights have just origins today only if 
each person has the equal opportunity to acquire them. The legitimate origin of 
property is not first possession but equal opportunity. This means that the 
progressives were right all along. We cannot be indifferent to the unjust origins of 
property, but it is equally true that we cannot be indifferent to the social, economic, 
and legal barriers that continue to prevent access to the property system today. Our 
most important philosophical traditions are premised on the twin concepts of 
democracy and equal opportunity. And if that is true, then using democratic means 
to limit or reallocate property rights to ensure equal opportunity and to promote 
social relations compatible with a free and democratic society not only is not a 
violation of property rights but also is compelled by the very reasons we created 
property rights in the first place. 
Our more enduring normative basis for the original acquisition of property is not 
the concept of first possession—and certainly not conquest. It is, instead, the 
democratic ideal of equal opportunity.57 If that is so, then the extent to which such 
equal opportunity does or does not exist becomes a question of fundamental 
importance. 
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